
“CARTHAGE”: NOT ONLY ABOUT CORRUPTION, BUT ABOUT STRATEGY
The NABU and SAPO operation “Carthage” is now at the centre of attention. Establishing the facts and assessing the actions of specific individuals is a matter for the investigation and the courts, so I deliberately leave personalities aside.
As a researcher, I am interested in something else: what systemic lessons does this situation offer for the development of law enforcement in Ukraine?
1️⃣ Lesson one: strategic management
Fraudulent call centres are not a new threat. Practitioners and international partners have been talking about it for years.
The Intelligence-Led Policing model requires a strategic threat assessment to cover more than the criminal market itself. It must also cover the vulnerability of the very channels through which the state counters that market.
If, according to the investigation, such a scheme could operate for a long time, this is a signal: such assessments are either not carried out systematically or do not become the basis for management decisions. Behind this lies a deeper risk: part of the managerial level is mentally unprepared to accept real change in the reform of law enforcement.
The analytical model requires a leader to be willing to see the real picture, even an uncomfortable one. It means transparent priorities, data-driven decisions and accountability for results.
Where integrity has not become part of management culture, where moral deformation occupies a manager’s entire mental space, there is simply no room left for strategic leadership. That is why this is no longer only a matter of competence: without leadership, an agency’s institutional capacity does not develop, and a modern model inevitably becomes a formality. Reform cannot be reduced to changing structures or renaming units. It requires leadership measured by strategic outcomes, not by statistics.
2️⃣ Lesson two: developing the anti-corruption system
The results achieved by NABU and SAPO are convincing, and it is precisely the independence of these institutions that made such an investigation possible.
So it is worth thinking one step ahead: how can the knowledge gained in such proceedings be turned into a tool for prevention?
Each such case is unique material for risk-based analysis:
🔹 which functions are most vulnerable;
🔹 which indicators could have signalled the risk earlier;
🔹 which procedures need strengthening.
Systematising typologies, indicators and scenarios makes it possible to move from reaction to forecasting.
A strong anti-corruption infrastructure is not only the ability to expose wrongdoing. It is also the ability to build the resilience of public institutions and society against the recurrence of such schemes. Cooperation between NABU, SAPO, NACP, law enforcement agencies, and the academic and expert community matters here.
📌 What, in my view, is needed:
✅ regular strategic threat assessments with a dedicated integrity-risk component for critical functions;
✅ analytical monitoring of criminal proceedings on priority threats: trends, effectiveness, anomalies;
✅ selection criteria for leaders that take into account their capacity for analysis-based strategic management;
✅ an institutional mechanism that turns the lessons of high-profile cases into preventive recommendations.
“Carthage” may become just another scandal. Or it may become a turning point towards mature strategic management.
The second option depends on whether we are ready to ask systemic questions rather than merely look for someone to blame.
#ILP #IntelligenceLedPolicing #StrategicManagement #Integrity #LawEnforcement #Prevention
